Jeff McMahn on Vegetarianism

Philosophy Bites did a pretty good interview with Jeff McMahn on vegetarianism.  I think he's a bit wrong about his comments on fish (the pain aspect and how less objectionable it is because of it).   I'll say more about it after I think about the interview a bit more.

The social costs of being vegetarian

Here's a pretty interesting interview with Melissa McEwen on Let them Eat Meat.  I've posted my main objection with Melissa's position, but I also want to say, that I might be splitting hairs here, since her diet isn't one that I would particularly disagree with (it sounds like she is what Singer would call a conscientious omnivore).

Over here Pamela JSW writes that we ought not be vegetarians because of the harm it does to us!  In the interview above, Melissa suggests one of the wrongs of a vegetarian diet is that it affects the family dynamic.  No longer can a single dish feed the entire family, but people must bend around the individual's eating preferences.  Pamela makes the same argument in her first argument. 

These are the social costs of being a vegetarian.  Are these enough reasons not the be a vegetarian?  (I'm not suggesting here that Melissa is saying that it is.  Pamela says this problem is surmountable)  I think that these should be taken seriously as concerns, since they do affect lots of people (everyone you know and would like to eat with you essentially), and they affect particularly the people you care about (family and friends). 

Being vegetarian is more than just choosing for yourself.  Its also being accommodating of others.  I'd never dream to invite myself over to a friend's house and demand a meat free meal.  If I'm invited, I might expect that they would take my eating choices into consideration.  But when I invite friends over, I also take their eating choices into consideration as well.  That's simple politeness.  Does this mean I sometimes buy meat?  Yes.  Not much, and not very often, but I do.  Does this go counter to my personal beliefs?  Yes.

But if I were a christian, and I invited someone over to my house, I wouldn't necessarily expect them to come to church with me.  There is a line somewhere in the hazy sands that we must draw, but where that line is, I don't expect to have an easy answer.    If my friend were Muslim and asked if she could pray while she was at my home, I wouldn't object. 

Pamela's third argument however, is a little more interesting.  She says that being a vegetarian may cause me to look down on others, in a moral way.  Seeing most of my friends are not vegetarians makes me look at them as morally inferior, or with a defected character, which would harm the relationships that I hold with them.

Now, I don't think is an absolute.  If you're a veg, or vegan that you will look down on others.  I think I do it every day.  Rather, instead, I think it might be indicative of a flaw in your own character, a kind of moral judgmental-ness.  Instead of evaluating a person as a whole in their moral character, one fixates on simply a particular aspect of their character.  Now no doubt, people can be bad people because of an aspect of their character, and ignore that aspect, they're a great person.  But a wise person (since we're talking virtue theory) would be able to distinguish between acts that tarnish the whole of a person's character, versus ones that do not.  I'm not sure diet is one that is, so I don't judge people based on their eating habits.  

Understanding animals, Understanding pain.

Is it really possible for us to understand an animal's experience?  I'm not sure that it is.  Clearly, there are classic arguments like Nagel's What is it like to be a bat, that shows that we will never know the subjective experience of having sonar from just looking at their brains.  I will never know the subjective experience of giving birth.  But this doesn't prevent me from understanding the pain that a woman is feeling when she is giving birth.

How do I understand this?  There are two ways.  1.  I can talk to her and ask her to describe what she's feeling.  This is the most obvious route, but its the less used route, strangely.  (Ma'am, you're currently screaming and there is a child coming out of your uterus, please rate on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the worst pain you've ever felt in your life, and 1 being in no pain at all, how you're feeling.  Is it a sharp pain?  Is it an ache?)  2.  The argument by analogy.  She is generally analagous to me.  She has two arms, two legs, a head, etc.  She yelps in pain like I do when I stub my toe.  She's screaming in pain, like I would if I were experiencing something quite painful and traumatic.  So she must be experiencing something quite painful and traumatic.

Both of these investigations into pain however a fundamentally flawed.  The argument by analogy doesn't give us a guarantee, or even a reasonable assurance that the experiences will be similar.  I've been thinking about this a lot lately, because of what my doctor told me recently.  Before my MRI, my doctor said that if he suspects that I have what he thinks I have, that he would be very surprised that I'm not in more pain.  Indeed, I did have what he thought I had, a herniated disc.  And I was in some considerable pain, but I guess I have a rather high tolerance for pain.  And so long as it isn't in my head (I use to get frequent headaches/migranes), I could deal with it.  So whereas my doctor would have been exhibiting much more pain responses (moaning groaning, complaining about the pain, or whatnot), I did not.  Did that mean I was experiencing less pain than he was thinking?  Not necessarily.

The direct route, also is flawed.  After my surgery, the nurse asked me to describe the pain that I was in, and what kind of pain I was willing to tolerate (to help gauge how much medication to give me).  I said I was probably at a 6, and could tolerate an 8.  She looked back at me, and said, "Remember, 10 is the worst pain you've ever experienced in your life."  I said, "Yeah.  This is definately not the worse pain I've experienced in life, but it definately hurts.  But I could definately tolerate it."  This was put to the test later, when I had physical therapy for the first time.  The PT made me stand up and walk around.  Its amazing how much your head weighs.  My neck is in excruciating pain (even with a pre-hit of morphine).  But I walked about 3x farther than the PT expected me to walk.  Ask me to rate that walk on a scale of 1-10, I'd say it was about an 8.  I definately didn't tolerate the walk very well, and even called my PT the "Bad Man" when he came back the next day for another round of torture (the second time included a walk all the way down the hall and back, some exercises with a fake step, and then I pushed him to let me walk up a flight of stairs). 

So what did this all mean in terms of communicating my pain?  Was I experiencing less pain than others?  Was I more tolerant of the pain that I experienced compared to others?  Both?  Neither? I haven't a clue.

So if I can't understand pain of others in any meaningful way, how can I make an argument by analogy with something that doesn't share a body deisgn like mine?  Does it hurt a cow when I poke him with a stick?  I certainly can't ask her.   

The bathroom dilemma: Yuck and Inconvenience

So last time, I presented the problem.  I've spent some time thinking about it, and in particular the false dilemma that I presented.

I presented the problem as a choice between the waterless urinal and the 1 gallon automatic flush urinal.  Many people have pointed out that I have a third option, the bushes by my office.  If I'm serious about saving water, and 2.5 minutes is too long to walk, then couldn't I water the bushes by my office as a compromise?  I did a little digging, and it turns out that it may actually beneficial to your plants (at least your tomato plants)!

But there is a pretty strong yuck factor involved in peeing in public.  So inconvenience versus yuck!  This is what ethicists are for!  First, generally, I don't think that yuck! is a justification.  If I said something like, "Peeing in public?  Yuck!"  That isn't good enough moral reason for me not to do it.  "Gays getting married?  Yuck!"  amounts to the same thing.  The argument from yuck is essentially:  This act disgusts me.  People should avoid doing disgusting acts.  Therefore I should not do this act.  Plug in anything that is disgusting and you have an argument.  But the relevancy of how an act makes us feel and whether we should do it is questionable.  I think barfing is disgusting, and cleaning up barf is probably more disgusting.  But I think I should do it (cleaning it up that is, not barfing per se).

But there is a difference between gay marriage and peeing in the bushes.  One issue has heavy "moral weight" and the other not.  I think something has "moral weight" when decisions made about x either affects a great deal of people, or affects some people in a great deal, in a significant way.  This is terribly vague I know, but I think the vagueness is necessary.  Gay marriage affects both a great deal of people, and some people in a great deal.  I'm not sure if peeing in the bushes would count in either sense.

So whats the point of this distinction?  I want to say that on issues that concern "everyday ethics," that is issues that have only a light "moral weight" do not require the same kinds of justifications as weighty moral issues.  "Yuck" may well be enough for me to  not to do something that that has little moral weight.  Why?  Yuck makes us unhappy, in a temporary sense, not in a lifelong sense.  When we engage in a something that is only yucky (cleaning up barf as opposed to torturing someone, which is both yucky and cruel), we usually don't think that this will ultimately affect our overall evaluation of our lives.  Everyday ethics deals with precisely that, a small wrong, not a wrong that will ultimately affect the overall moral evaluation of our lives.  The less weighty a moral issue, the more it can be affected by yuck!

So I'm not peeing in the bushes.  Why?  Because its not a morally weighty issue and it makes me go yuck! The burden of proof, I think, is on others to show why this is a morally weighty issue that forces me to discount yuck.   If we were talking about being a vegan versus being a vegetarian, would the yuck factor be enough to take veganism off the table?  I'm coming around to the possibility of it being morally light enough because the difference of moral weight between a vegan and a vegetarian is the difference between being a good person and a slightly better person.  But if we were talking about the difference between a vegetarian and a omnivore, even a conscientious one, the difference in weight is significantly larger because of reasonable doubts about where our food is coming from.  It turns the compassionate omnivore into a regular omnivore.

So what about the other possibility, that its too inconvenient?  If morally light issues can be overridden by yuck, could it be overridden by inconvenience?  I think it might.  But first we should compare yuck with inconvenience.  I think most people would pick something inconvenient over something yucky.  It may be inconvenient for me not to eat anything at this moment, but it sure beats eating something yucky.  So, yuck gives us better reasons to reject some moral proposition than inconvenience because it affects our lives in a greater magnitude than yuck (and remember I'm not saying that yuck or inconvenience is affecting our over all lives a great deal).  So if its merely inconvenient that I walk 2.5 minutes to the waterless urinal, then I should, since the ethical gain is worth it.  But what if I drank a cup of coffee at home, drove half an hour to work, and really needed to go?  I don't think people would typically label this an inconvenience.  We hyperbolically describe these situations as emergencies.  But what actually is happening is that we are faced with turning something inconvenient (walking 2.5 minutes) into something yucky (soiling ourselves).  The moral weight of the issue hasn't changed, but our justification for rejecting the 2.5 minute walk has.  Heck, even compared to the yuck of peeing in public and the yuck of soiling ourselves, peeing in public would be the more preferable option. 

So... unless I'm being pressed with a yucky situation, I have a moral obligation to use the waterless urinal.

Factory Farming

Today I presented vegetarianism to my ethics class.  Here are some more links to help people understand factory farming.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factory_farming
http://www.idausa.org/facts/factoryfarmfacts.html
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/campaigns/factory_farming/

And a couple of links to vegetarian health
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/vegetarian-diet/HQ01596
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16441942

I tried to avoid any site that is obviously biased (PETA etc,) and included sites that have good reputations (the humane society, mayo clinic).  And for the other side:

http://www.amazon.com/Vegetarian-Myth-Food-Justice-Sustainability/dp/1604860804

Although, I don't think that this book really presents the arguments fairly.  Cherry picked statistics and straw man arguments seem to miss the point about animal suffering.  Instead she focuses on the quacks (All animals should live, and we should protect animals from each other), and sympathy (animals die in making your lettuce).  I don't have a problem with animals dying.  They die all the time.  I just don't think that humans should inflict unnecessary suffering, which she doesn't seem to give much justice to, and seems to believe that if we all became vegetarians, that we would have need more farmland, rather than less, which even government statistics point out is plainly false.

Lingering Doubts of a Vegetarian

Veganism is not my cup of tea.  I simply can't do it.  But does that mean I'm promoting animal cruelty?  This has been discussed at length elsewhere, so I'm not going to go into it.  I think that being a vegetarian is definately doing a lot of good for the environment, since it reduces animal suffering by reducing demand of factory farmed animals.

But what about incidental animal products?  By incidental I mean things that are made from animals that they're not directly farmed for.  Arguably there are no incidental products, everything that animals give us are part of why we raise them.  I'm thinking of things like leather and such.  On my person I could probably count at least 10 animal products that would rule me out of being vegan (shoes, belt, wallet, backpack, dental floss, tylenol, coat, watch (its a waterproof one), lip balm).  Not to mention things like packaging that these things come in, preservatives that my food has, and the drugs that I take, even the stitches or sutures that would be put on me if I needed them.

Being a vegetarian allows me to utilize animal products, but that doesn't guarantee that the animal products I utilize are from humanely treated animals....  In fact there really is in no way to tell since many incidental animal products are not regulated by the FDA since they're not going to be eaten.

Perfection is the enemy of progress though.  I'm not morally perfect, but I'm moving towards doing a lot of good.  Maybe some day I will eliminate leather from my person, or wax products, but until then, I can sleep at night knowing that I'm still doing a lot of good.

Transparency in food

I've said before that transparency in our food is important for us to be responsible omnivores.  Since that isn't possible, I don't think we should be omnivores.  But for those who believe that there is enough transparency in our food, you might want to look at this link.  Two high school students, sequenced the DNA from a variety of food sources and found that they were not as advertised.  High quality caviar was in fact from a very common "low grade" source of caviar, the Mississippi Paddlefish.  Goat's milk cheese turned out to be made from a cow. 

It makes me worry as a vegetarian since if even the listed ingredients aren't accurate, then how can we as vegetarians be sure that our tofurkey is really just tofu? 

Will the real Nietzsche please stand up?

If you've been following the comments, in my last vegetarian post, my friend Gary brought up Nietzsche.  And no offense to Gary, but I think he has Nietzsche a bit wrong.  So here's my interpretation of Nietzsche, tempered a lot by Robert Solomon's What Nietzsche Really Said.

Nietzsche is a virtue theorist.  He's telling us that there is a particular kind of character that we should be developing, and he calls it the Ubermensch.  Now this is not within reach of everyone, only a few people have what it takes to become this.  So how does one try to achieve this character? 

Unlike Aristotle, Nietzsche doesn't know what the Ubermensch is like, because the Ubermensch is beyond human.  We must transcend our human natures to become more than what we are.  He says that at best we can contrast it with the Last Man and say what he is not.  He is not a follower, he is not a sheep, he is not a person who disappears into the comfort of conformity.  Essentially, the Ubermensch must be authentic, in the existentialist sense.  Someone who will be genuinely themselves, not renting their lives out to a kind-of-life.

But this is not enough to become the Ubermensch.  The Ubermensch is a creator as much as he is a destroyer of old values.  Overcoming the traditional christian, and Aristotelian ethic, the Ubermensch must then forge a new system of virtues.  This system of virtues and values will be a life affirming one, instead of a life denying one.  Life-affirming for Nietzsche is to embrace the Will to Power.  Power, not being literally strength, but an intensification of life. 

Probably the best analog to the Will to Power is art.  Art is an intensification of beauty or expression, and even better, it is the result of a creative re-invention of the world.  Nietzsche wants us to all to become works of art.  But like all works of art, not all of them are going to be great.  There will be lots of mediocre works of art, and none of those will be the Ubermensch.  But the fact that people are trying to be works of art, is better than those who are purely satisfied with what they are. 

Works of art force us to re-evaluate ourselves, and the world that we live in, through the artist's lens.  This is how the Ubermensch is to be viewed, in terms of generating new values.  His is a work of art so masterful, that it creates a new movement in the artworld entirely.  It necessarily means that the Ubermensch is inspirational in character, but not purposefully, otherwise he just becomes another preacher.  But through the strength of his character, people will want to imitate. 

So what would Nietzsche say about eating animals?  Absolutely nothing, just like Aristotle says nothing on the subject.  His ethic is one of character development, not of evaluation of actions.  And even if there was something to be said by Nietzsche about animals, he would tell us to disregard it, because he is not the Ubermensch, and merely following in Nietzsche's footsteps would necessarily mean that you're a sheep, never striving for authenticity.  Perhaps the only thing we can say about Nietzsche and vegetarianism would be this:  If it is a creative re-interpretation of the world for you to eat or not eat meat, then it is good. 

Here's where I'll interject and say that I think its far more sheep like to simply continue eating meat, than to be a vegetarian.  But, only be a vegetarian because of authentic reasons.  Likewise, be a meat-eater for authentic reasons.  If you can authentically say that it doesn't matter how you get your taste buds to tingle with pleasure, then by all means, eat meat (according to Nietzsche).  I can't authentically do that because I care about others' suffering. 

What to Tell Vegetarians: A response

A friend of mine pointed me to this blog post today, a response to people who advocate vegetarianism.  So I thought I'd post a friendly response to the points made in the post.  I'm not sure if the post reflects the blogger's views, or Harvey Ussery's position... I think it's Ussery's though, so I'll direct them at him.

The first part of the blog post is about the subject experience of killing animals.  I rarely bring this up, only because, well... its subjective.  Some people might be thrilled and invigorated by killing animals, others not so much.  But ultimately, this point is moot.  If something is immoral, its not because people enjoy it or do not enjoy it.  Clearly, people enjoy lots of immoral things, and don't enjoy things that are perfectly morally permissible (like going to the dentist, or cleaning the toilet).

So it's not whether or not someone has killed the food that they eat, but whether or not they can choose not to eat the food that they eat.  This is something we can all clearly do.  I don't take the "moral high ground" because I don't kill animals.  I take the "moral high ground" because I don't participate in activities that lead to the unnecessary suffering of animals (raising them in factory farmed conditions).

The next point is where Ussery is right on the money.  He writes:

Where you and I probably disagree most is this: While no one would claim that the wolf is being immoral when he catches and eats the rabbit, you probably assume that for me, a human being, eating meat is merely an option which I (selfishly) choose by preference—and I could just as easily satisfy my dietary needs with a strictly plant-based diet. Well, I do not see my eating of animals as merely optional. Based on extensive research on the matter, I believe that animal proteins, and especially high quality fats (and the fat-soluble vitamins they either contain or enhance), are essential for optimal health. Thus “kill and eat” is as imperative for me as for the wolf.

I think Ussery is making two points here.  First, that its okay for animals to eat other animals, so consequently I can eat animals as well.  Second, that eating animals are essential for optimal health. 

First:  Yes, animals do eat other animals, but this isn't a moral act because animals can't reason morally.  And even if they can reason morally, carnivorous animals MUST eat meat in order to survive, since they cannot derive all of their nutrients from plant sources by themselves.  Being held morally responsible for our actions implies that we can do otherwise.  In the case of animals, they can't do otherwise because their biology prevents them, and because they can't reason to the alternatives if they can do otherwise.

But probably more importantly, I don't think that we should determine our morality based on animals' actions.  Animals sometimes eat their young, rape, males of many species kill babies to encourage females to reproduce again with them, etc.. 

Second:  Animals are not required for optimal health of the human body.  There are 8 essential ammino acids that the body needs to survive (12 non-essential).  All of them can be found from plant sources.  But Ussery's argument isn't about survival...  Its about optimal health.  If vegetarians can't reach optimal health because of their diets, then we might have reasons to be omnivorous. 

Unfortunately, Ussery's argument fails on that level as well.  Brendan Brazier was featured not too long ago on Oprah.  He is a Triathlete, holds a couple of course records, and is a vegan.  I wouldn't go so far as to say that it is easy to be in optimal health, espescially as a vegetarian, but it is possible.  Besides, reaching optimal health is difficult for most people, even on a diet with meat included.

In fact, there is plenty of evidence that suggests eating meat prevents us from reaching optimal health.  Heart disease is the most common killer of Americans, and it is largely attributable to an excess intake of cholesterol which is not found in plants, only animal sources.  The American Society for Clinical Nutrition published an article in 2003, that indicated that vegetarians live significantly longer lives than non-vegetarians.
Ussery points out that as a backyard farmer, he treats his animals much more humanely than the factory farmers.  This I can agree with.  But since backyard farming is impractical for most people because of the time commitment, or because of laws or space availability, those that cannot raise their animals themselves must rely on mass producers to get their meat, which means that the lives of the animals, the point that Ussery wants to focus on, is probably a dismal one. 

Finally, Ussery turns the question back to the vegetarian:

...let me return your personal question with one for you: What is the percentage of the food on your table, year round, that you produce yourself, or that you buy face to face from producers you know personally, so you also know how that food was produced, and at what cost to living beings? My estimate is 85% for my own table. If you have not a clue where your vegetarian fare was produced, by whom, at what cost to other players in the local ecology, including economically oppressed humans—then do not dare presume a moral superiority based on the fact that I do indeed kill animals in my backyard, in the context of a way of food production which is most of all about regeneration, about healing, about ensuring an agricultural base “unto the seventh generation.

I confess, I don't know where most of my vegetables come from.  But where my food comes from doesn't make that much of a difference, ultimately speaking.  Sure there might be ecological costs with industrialized farming, but the fact is, its is almost infinitely easier to get environmentally responsible raised crops than humanely treated meat at the local grocery store. 

The heart of Ussery's question here is this:  Am I a perfectly moral person?  If I'm not then I can't proclaim that Ussery is a engaging in questionably moral behavior.  I'll admit, that I'm not a perfectly moral person.  But that doesn't mean that I can't point out other people's moral flaws.  And I would hope others would do the courtesy to me to point out my own moral short comings, so that I can attempt to correct them.

When it comes to food, we really only have two present choices, an omnivorous diet, or a vegetarian diet.  I think there are plenty of reasons for saying the vegetarian diet is the more ethically responsible, healthy diet than the omnivorous one.  Does that make a person a morally bad person for eating meat?  I don't think so, but I think we can be better people by not eating meat. 

Why I am not a Demi-vegetarian

A demi-vegetarian is a person who eats little meat and is conscious about where they get it, trying to minimize the suffering of animals.  Peter Singer calls it Compassionate Omnivorism.  I think thats a mouthful, so I like to call it demi-vegetarianism like R.M. Hare.  I was a demi-vegetarian for about 4 years before I converted to being a full vegetarian (with the exception of gelatin.... man you just can't get away from that stuff).

Michael Pollan really turned me into a vegetarian, contrary to his own thesis. In the Omnivore's Dilemma he goes out of his way to show us that there are humanely treated animals. I don't disagree. However, he points out that the industrial organic machine of Whole Foods isn't much better in terms of animal treatment. I agree.

So our alternative is to find the humanely treated meat.... But how exactly do we do that? Its rather impractical (at least for me) to research all of our food options to discover the treatment of the animals.  The farm that Pollan features in his book, he also points out will not ship any of their meat.  So if I want the idyllic farm setting that Pollan describes in his book, I think I have to go to Pensylvania to get it, which is impractical for me, considering I'm in California.  The alternative was of course humanely treated meat.  Whole Foods might be a place where the typical demi-vegetarian would shop.  But Pollan's description of the industrial organic machine wasn't much better than the standard factory farm.  Sure things would be organic, but organic doesn't equate to humane, and when producing food at the scale that Whole Foods demands, its difficult to imagine that the food would indeed be truly humane.

It forced me from considering my self a compassionate omnivore, to what I really was, a-hope-and-faith-in-the-compassion-of-people-who-are-saying-they-are-compassionate-to-their-animals-and then-trying-to-turn-a-profit omnivore.

Consider the analogy of clothing. If you were vehemently against sweatshop labor, and you found a label that said that it was not made in a sweatshop, and bought it on faith that it was not from a sweatshop, even though it was in fact from a sweatshop. Would you be any better than the person who was not conscious of buying their clothes from a sweatshop? Maybe in terms of character you would be... But good characters want to ACTUALLY do good things, not seemingly good things.
 
Peter Singer spoke at Stanford last year about compassionate omnivorism, advocating it.  I asked him how it we could actually get that kind of meat, and he replied that it was simply readily available*.  I don't buy it.  It strikes me as being naively trusting in a network of suppliers that have never earned my trust, and have been shown time and time again that they don't deserve our trust.
 
There can't be a middle ground on this until the meat industry is willing to make food production transparent.  Only then can we really be assured that the animals we're eating are humanely treated, and a middle ground, demi-vegetarianism, becomes reasonable.  Until then, the argument for demi-vegetarianism is a good one, but not one that is practicable by the majority of people.

*I'm simplifying my question and his response for the sake of brevity here.